Volume 6 / Year 2025
by VAIBHAVI MAHAJAN
Published: Aug 05, 2025 Edited by: AUDREY BERTIN DOI: 10.38105/spr.al5ay69qu7

The AUKUS (Australia, U.K., and U.S.) security partnership could significantly enhance trilateral coordination and protect critical national infrastructure through the integration of advanced space capabilities. This article describes the recent regulatory changes that could galvanize AUKUS and allied partners to exchange data and technology, interoperable spaceports, and other launch capabilities supporting next generation active defense initiatives. As the space economy surges in the next decade, this regulatory change is a first step in allied security in the space domain.

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Highlights

  • The AUKUS security partnership has relaxed its export controls on advanced technology.
  • Space technology specifically can benefit from this change, and the public and private sector can more easily trade and launch goods that previously required a license.
  • The new rulings come with potential regulatory challenges that will need to be addressed, like applying the export controls uniformly across countries, ensuring they match each other's pace.

The trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) was established in 2021 to strengthen the ability of three long-standing democracies to support security and defense interests and build on long-standing bilateral ties [1]. Through AUKUS, the three countries are working across the full spectrum of capability development, generating requirements, co-developing new systems, deepening industrial based collaboration, and ultimately delivering advanced capabilities to their forces. AUKUS consists of two pillars that outline the goals and commitments behind the countries in the alliance. Pillar 1 supports Australia’s acquisition of conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines with the aid of the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.). AUKUS has since grown as a symbol of shared security for the three regions [2] (1). AUKUS’s Pillar 2, on the other hand, is broader and supports collaboration and cooperation on a variety of emerging technologies, such as quantum computing, artificial intelligence, hypersonics, cyber, and other advanced capabilities. Pillar 2 aims to promote specific projects while also supporting the technology sharing and cooperation of advanced technology more generally. Given the rise of tensions in the Indo-Pacific, China’s military build-up, and military tests in the region, AUKUS is a tool to ensure safety and security in the area [3]. Pillar 1 came to fruition with progress on the nuclear-powered submarines as the “SSN-AUKUS” class in March 2023, demonstrating the three countries’ joint efforts in a shared security alliance through investments. Pillar 2 also shows promise; for example, in May 2023, the U.K. hosted the first AUKUS technology demonstration associated with the Pillar, with an initial joint deployment of Australian, U.K. and U.S. AI-enabled assets in a collaborative swarm to detect and track military targets in a representative environment in real time [4]. The trial achieved world firsts, including the live retraining of models in flight and the interchange of AI models between AUKUS nations [5]. Demonstrations like this are the first step to developing interoperable technology that the three countries can utilize. Through these pillars and partnerships, the alliance is designed to strengthen deterrence to future threats through advancing capabilities through collaboration. Further, AUKUS establishes a deep industrial base of collaboration and supply chain security that could enhance U.S. operations.

Reactions to the alliance

However, not everyone was pleased with the announcement of AUKUS–Australia, in pulling out of a multi-million dollar defense deal with France to instead sign onto AUKUS, came as a shock to Paris [6]. Further, the alliance begs the question of why these three countries specifically were chosen; foreign policy officials are discussing Japan and South Korea’s potential incorporation into Pillar 2 [7].

The reason for the exclusion likely revolves around Australia’s need for nuclear powered submarines to combat threats in the Indo-Pacific, which is in the shared interest of the U.S. and the U.K. These three countries, whose foreign policy goals are closely aligned and are already members of the the Five Eyes alliance (a global intelligence alliance composed of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.), chose to pursue AUKUS largely due to shared strategic interest. While other countries do have the opportunity to join in Pillar 2, an area that has yet to be fully developed, the initial shockwave of AUKUS stemmed from the fact that it was a secret agreement between the three countries before being announced [8].

Further, not everyone in Australia specifically is pleased with the alliance; in fact, Australia is largely uninterested in foreign and defense policy outside of times of war [9]. A poll by the U.S. Studies Centre asked in 2023 whether Australians believed the AUKUS submarines warrant their price tag; only 21 percent of voters thought they were worth it [10]. Still, in an Australia China Relations Institute Research Centre and Centre for Business Intelligence and Data Analytics poll, when Australians were asked whether they agreed with the statement “The Australian government’s plan to acquire nuclear submarines under the Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership will help keep Australia secure from a military threat from China”, over half agreed [11]. The alliance still has importance, but when shown the larger picture and economic costs of AUKUS, Australians are not so keen. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, Australians’ trust in the U.S. to act responsibly in the world has dropped significantly. Despite the drop in trust towards the U.S., the vast majority of Australians (around 80 percent) continue to say the alliance is ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important for Australia’s security, in line with 2024 (about 83 percent) [12]. The results demonstrate that the overall popularity of the general alliance remains strong in Australia.

Chart representing Australian public opinion and trust metrics towards alliances
Figure 1
Trends in Australian public perception regarding trust in international strategic partners and alliance value.

Changing the rules

In an effort to solidify the reality of the alliance, secure regional interests, and utilize shared advanced technologies, the three countries have implemented a new ruling to aid with innovation. A key aspect of the partnership is enhanced collaboration by bringing change to the trilateral regulatory environment.

To do this, the governments aimed to find a common thread between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2, aiming to target defense while encouraging advanced technologies. The U.S. government eased technology export controls in a new AUKUS exemption released in November 2024, including many space-related technologies (2). This exemption will make it easier for U.S. companies to sell satellites, launch vehicles, and other space-related technologies to Australia and the U.K. Additionally, these changes are beneficial for sharing satellite components in an emerging Australian satellite manufacturing industry. In tandem with the U.S. AUKUS exemption, Australia and the U.K. also eased technology controls to match the pace. This exemption has the potential to bolster economic growth in Australia specifically, and could change overall public opinion on AUKUS.

Space export control and regulatory environment

The space export control environment prior to the ruling has been updated consistently to match the pace of innovation of commercial companies. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, for example, authorized the removal of satellites and related items from the USML (6). As a result, the Department of State revised the ITAR and USML Category XV (Spacecraft and Related Articles) in rules that became effective in November 2014; this supported a broader Export Control Reform initiative to unleash U.S. exports of products and services outside the country (7,8).

The update to Category XV marked a significant shift for the space industry, concluding a 15-year era during which most U.S. satellites and components were classified as defense articles under ITAR. Before export control reforms, Category XV included a concise yet broad set of controls, largely lacking detailed performance thresholds to distinguish capabilities. Everything from the nuts and bolts of the system were subject to ITAR. While export controls were easier to understand and comply with, the new ruling makes it even easier to trade space technology between AUKUS partners specifically [13].

Space-related technologies traditionally have required significant license approvals from a variety of organizations based on countries’ regulatory structures, security controls, and economic policies. These license approvals often require a lengthy process through a variety of government organizations within a country, and threaten an organization’s ability to launch/operate on time and provide for its customers. Further, these licenses require individuals at the company with a specific subset of expertise to understand; an investment that smaller businesses may not have the means to make. From these licensing restrictions, many satellite technologies have been restricted, including launch separation and integration technologies, electric propulsion, star trackers, and rocket engines and motors.

Easing restrictions

With the new exemption, the AUKUS partners can facilitate collaboration in space-related initiatives and accelerate the development of satellite constellations, reducing time-to-market.

For example, the AUKUS exemption significantly eases restrictions on transferring both classified and unclassified satellite components, systems, and related technologies (1). This is critical for satellite manufacturers and operators, as many components, like sensors, propulsion systems, and control systems, fall under the Department of State’s (DoS) International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) control. Previously, companies needed to obtain ITAR licenses to move these technologies between countries for manufacturing, testing, or operational deployment [14]. The exemption now passes these transfers to registered authorized users within AUKUS countries. This removes a major bottleneck and reduces the time, cost, and complexity of international collaboration on space-related technology; further, given the rise of the commercial space industry across the globe, the exemption will significantly benefit the emerging commercial space industry.

The proposed rule

Effective September 1, 2024, ITAR §126.7: Exemption for Defense Trade and Cooperation Among Australia, the U.K., and the U.S., also known as the “AUKUS Exemption,” released by the U.S. DoS Department of Directorate and Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) eased export restrictions on AUKUS nations between or among authorized users (1). While defense articles, technical data, and defense services on the U.S. Munitions List (a list of articles, services, and related technology designated as defense and space-related by the U.S. government, requiring export licenses for their transfer) remain subject to ITAR, authorized exporters are allowed to utilize the AUKUS exemption in lieu of applying for a license, where applicable (3). The rule does include an Excluded Technologies List (ETL) of certain technologies that still require licenses to be exported (Australia and the U.K. can still access equipment on the ETL, but need a license to do so (4)). The rule also expedites the licensing process for certain defense article and defense service exports, and allows for the transfer of classified defense articles to certain dual nationals who are authorized users within the U.K. and Australia.

Public comments closed on November 22nd, 2024, and upon adjudication may result in amendments to the rule.

Other space rulings

As seen in Figure 2, the U.S. Department of Commerce hosted a public briefing in November 2024 to explain the AUKUS ruling alongside other rulings that have been proposed to help relax restrictions on the space industry specifically [15]. The public briefing’s target audience was companies so that they could understand the rulings in the context of their businesses and provide feedback accordingly, as well as receive clarity on a complex subject.

Summary diagram of public briefings and distinct space rulings
Figure 2
Chronological rollout and components of Department of Commerce and State Department commercial space export exemptions.

Four other recent DoS and DOC rules stem from a December 2023 meeting of the National Space Council (NSpC), which crafts space policy and strategy to advance U.S. leadership in space while protecting U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The rules are designed to improve trade between the U.S. and other allies, including some that extend beyond AUKUS countries.

Department of State ITAR U.S. Munitions List Categories IV and XV: This ruling modifies Categories IV and XV of the U.S. Munitions List (USML), reclassifying certain space-related defense items. It adds advanced propulsion systems, AI-driven guidance, and control technologies, while eliminating redundant entries and shifting certain dual-use items—such as spacecraft with autonomous tracking or collision avoidance—from ITAR jurisdiction to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These changes aim to streamline commercial space exports by reclassifying many systems as commercial rather than military, transferring oversight from the ITAR-regulated USML to the more flexible Commerce Control List (CCL). As a result, some space-related items may no longer require export licenses when shipped to close allies. Unlike the ITAR, the CCL enables a more adaptable regulatory approach, potentially supporting stronger international partnerships and expanding opportunities for U.S. companies in markets like Europe and Asia.

The rule also includes four license exemptions to support space activity. These include:

Official Space Agency Exemption: Authorizes certain transfers of defense articles and services wholly within the scope of an official USG space program.

Space Activity Exemption: Authorizes certain transfers supporting space launches including electrical connectors and transponders.

Space Tourism and Research Exemption: Authorizes certain transfers of crewed spacecraft for tourism or fundamental research in suborbital environments that don’t transfer ownership or control to a foreign person.

EAR Incorporated Defense Articles: Authorizes defense articles when incorporated into spacecraft that are subject to the EAR.

Department of Commerce EAR Final Rule: The EAR final rule removes licensing requirements for technologies related to remote sensing, space-based logistics, and servicing spacecraft for the U.K., Canada, and Australia.

Department of Commerce EAR Interim Final Rule: The interim final rule lifts the licensing requirements for less sensitive satellite and spacecraft parts and components to more than 40 allied nations including Canada, Australia, Japan, South Korea and most of the European Union. It also broadens license exceptions for specific items involved in NASA cooperative programs.

Department of Commerce Department Proposed Rule: Integrating ITAR and EAR frameworks for commercial space applications, the rule aims to simplify compliance for companies, removing license requirements for exports of certain spacecraft components to over 40 allies and partners worldwide, reducing licensing requirements for the least sensitive components for most destinations, and broadening license exceptions to support additional NASA cooperative programs. The rules can support the AUKUS security partnership, and the U.S.’s ability to grow the economy and collaborate on mutual space priorities.

Economic impact

From these reforms in export controls and technology sharing, the U.K. expects 500 million pounds of U.K. defense exports each year and billions of dollars of trade across all three nations, helping boost U.K. economic growth and overall stability [16]. Further, the Australian government has eliminated the need for 900 permits required to export defense goods to the U.S. and U.K., covering a value of 5 billion dollars annually [17]. Under President Trump’s latest tariff environment, these numbers may differ. While Australia worries that the new tariff policies could erode the foundations of Australia’s alliance with the U.S., experts assure that those in isolation will not hinder the alliance [18]. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) estimates the removal of this license requirement for Australia, Canada, and the U.K. will result in a reduction of 90 license applications being submitted to BIS annually, significantly reducing employees’ workload and allowing them to process technology that does require a license even faster [19].

Although the AUKUS alliance is a security partnership, the new exemption gives way to economic benefits for all countries involved while enhancing their security capabilities.

Significance for the space industry

The AUKUS exemption under ITAR §126.7 now allows for the simplified export, reexport, and retransfer of satellite components, hardware, and technical data across the U.S., U.K., and Australia, provided all parties are registered as “Authorized Users.” This exemption is crucial for satellite manufacturers and operators, especially when dealing with critical components like propulsion systems, sensors, or on-board control mechanisms that previously required extensive ITAR licensing.

Now, as long as these transfers stay within the AUKUS countries, companies can avoid the long wait times and administrative hurdles of obtaining some kinds of licenses. However, transfers involving defense articles on the ETL—such as satellite technologies related to nuclear propulsion or missile defense—remain ineligible. The AUKUS exemption reduces the number of licenses that the government will need to adjudicate. ITAR categories with some space technologies that will experience reduced export controls under the AUKUS framework include:

Category IV: Covers space transportation systems and related components, such as space launch vehicles, engines, and guidance systems. Reduced controls may apply to technical data related to certain types of space launch vehicle technologies that are shared within the AUKUS framework.

Category IX: Covers certain tactical missile technologies or systems related to space capabilities, but are subject to strict adherence to the agreement’s provisions.

Category XI: Covers technologies related to space guidance systems, inertial navigation systems, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology. This category typically involves technologies that support navigation, attitude control, and related systems on spacecraft.

Category XV: Covers satellites, spacecraft, space systems design, and the underlying technologies that support these systems. Certain types of controlled satellite technologies and space design tools can be shared, provided the conditions of the exemption are met.

ITAR §126.7, the new AUKUS exemption, enables companies to work more efficiently with international partners, accelerates project timelines, and reduces compliance burdens while maintaining security and records requirements. The AUKUS exemption will also impact the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, which will have a large impact on space launches [20].

Australia adapts rules

Australia, in an effort to align with the AUKUS security objectives and the subsequent changes with the exemption, have updated their strategic export control laws and frameworks to ensure advanced technologies are monitored and restricted in line with the AUKUS agreement [21]. Further, Australia has strengthened the licensing requirements for advanced defense technologies, specifically those under AUKUS’s Pillar 2, so that sensitive technologies will not be transferred without the proper approvals [22]. Australia has enhanced safeguards for these sensitive defense and dual-use technologies that could inadvertently end up with unauthorized users [23]. Further, they have aligned with partner nation policies under the AUKUS framework to restrict sensitive technologies to collaborative defense research and operational needs [24].

U.K. adapts rules

The U.K. has also adapted its export control policies in an effort to support the alliance. They have strengthened dual-use technology controls by updating export control regimes to cover emerging technologies [25]. Further, they enhanced export licensing for advanced capabilities with military end-use applications, including those used in decision-making, autonomous weapons, or advanced targeting technologies [26]. The U.K. has strengthened technology collaboration agreements including facilitating secure technology sharing with AUKUS partners and tailored control agreements while maintaining safeguards against misuse or unauthorized transfers [27]. They have also broadened the scope of their export control list to cover emerging and foundational technologies vital for military innovation, such as advanced semiconductor development, and other emerging fields that could support AUKUS Pillar 2 objectives [28].

Challenges

There are a variety of challenges to the AUKUS ruling revolving around geopolitical tension and regulatory concerns.

  • Proliferation risks: The relaxation of export controls could lead to sensitive dual-use (can be used for both civilian and military purposes) technologies being misused or proliferated to unauthorized countries. AUKUS partners must ensure that the exemption is only being used by authorized users to prevent the proliferation of highly sensitive technologies to potential adversaries.
  • Lack of regulatory consistency: Discrepancies in how export controls are applied between countries. Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. would need to match each other’s pace in adapting export controls to continue this innovation, and apply the export controls uniformly between countries.
  • Supply chain security: Concerns with securing supply chains and ensuring that sensitive, advanced technologies are not shared with unauthorized persons. This could potentially compromise other sensitive international export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) or other multilateral agreements by allowing certain exemptions, thus undermining efforts for uniformity.
  • Cultural setbacks: Where even after the rule changes, countries are hesitant to engage with another nation as it could be seen as too difficult. This hesitancy could stem from different expectations regarding military cooperation, reluctance to share classified data, and a country’s own historical experience in bilateral and multilateral partnerships [29].

The key challenge for governments is balancing national security with economic stability and international trade relationships. While export controls can strengthen strategic objectives, they may come at the cost of economic growth and global supply disruptions. Careful coordination through diplomacy, international agreements, and strategic supply agreements may be necessary to mitigate these costs. These challenges highlight the need for careful coordination and transparency when implementing changes to export controls under the AUKUS framework while balancing technological sharing with national and global security concerns.

Impact on the alliance

In informal roundtables, Australian and U.K. stakeholders have expressed perspective on the changes [30].

Positive impacts of the changes within the AUKUS partners included:

The exemptions, combined with the Technical Safeguards Agreement (TSA) with the U.S., opens opportunity. Further, there will be strong interest in Australia from its regional allies, and companies will realize that trade flows are easier and are more inclined to start business.

Cautionary perspectives on the changes within the AUKUS partners included:

AUKUS only works if it’s two-way; there is the potential for Australia and the U.K. to get flooded by U.S. products if only U.S. companies take advantage of the rule. Further, the rules potentially set up a system that does not promote all partners’ equities. The need to communicate benefits, opportunities, and practical outcomes to operators at the implementation level poses a problem—for example, those who manage permits will act on them, understanding that they will not be punished for sharing a technology under the rule.

Impact on the space industry

The ruling has a variety of implications for the space industry, both in commercial and civil space partnerships. Potential positive impacts of the changes on the space industry include [31, 32]:

  • Protecting domestic companies from foreign competition (while this builds local economies, it eliminates the competition that provides quality and affordable products to consumers).
  • Leveling the playing field by eliminating a foreign industry’s competitive advantage.
  • Creating employment within a country by encouraging an industry to manufacture its own products.
  • Protecting a country from being the recipient of goods that have been rejected by other countries, known as dumping.
  • Increasing tax revenue and aiding economic growth through deficit reduction.
  • Increasing innovation by stimulating an increase in the number of innovative patent applications and direct investments.
  • Reducing corporate research and development investment.
  • Reducing U.S. competitiveness where controls could reduce U.S. competitiveness and revenue.
  • Shifting production for security reasons, such as where batteries in electric vehicles are sourced (e.g., now outside of Russia and China).

On the other hand, there are a number of concerns regarding implementation and externalities that the rule could cause, which include [31, 32]:

  • Harm to domestic exporting firms (who lose foreign sales or are forced to sell at lower prices) or importing firms denied access to inputs by foreign retaliatory “copycat” actions, lowering domestic investment and economic growth.
  • Increased the price of certain goods or services because of increased taxes, enforcement costs, and costs for procuring and maintaining larger than normal supply/stockpile/reserves.
  • Shortages due to discouraging one country from exporting goods or services to another.
  • Lost producer revenue and foregone investment.
  • Increased friction between two countries, hurting their long-term relationship.
  • Bottlenecks caused by regulations and undercut by contracts awarded to another company/country.
  • Supply chain impacts which require more precision in targeting.
  • Dissonance with other partners while attempting to relax restrictions with key partners.

As commercial space activity diversifies, new regulations can support industry growth by expanding market opportunities while safeguarding national security and foreign policy interests.

Both government and industry continue to assess commercially available technologies to ensure that reduced export control exemptions do not hinder the competitiveness of AUKUS members in defense and advanced technology projects. These efforts also aim to foster innovation and interoperability among AUKUS nations.

While the proposed regulatory changes could have a significant impact, their effect will depend on the final rules and their implementation timeline. Many remain in the proposal stage and are currently open for public comment. Organizations should closely monitor updates to U.S. export regulations and, once finalized, adjust compliance processes accordingly. This includes leveraging new tools such as proposed exemptions as they become available. Staff should continue coordinating with their export control offices to obtain export determinations, review classifications, and ensure compliance with U.S. export regulations.

Using the rule

To utilize the rule, companies can have interoperable launch with other countries under the AUKUS alliance. Companies must register as an authorized user to be able to utilize the license exemption and ensure the technology does not fall under the ETL. With this, companies can have responsive launch and be able to deploy satellites and other spacecraft at higher speeds than before without the regulatory burden.

The current U.S. space regulatory landscape, as seen in Figure 3, falls under the jurisdiction of a web of organizations depending on what a space company produces. The AUKUS exemption, which falls under the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense and Trade Controls, would lessen the restrictions for five out of the seven categories in Figure 3 [33].

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As an example of how a company can use the rules based on the countries involved, Australia has some of the largest recoverable critical mineral deposits on Earth, including high-quality cobalt, lithium, manganese, rare earth elements, tungsten and vanadium. Companies can gain access to these critical minerals which are necessary to develop components for spacecraft. The exemption provides a unique opportunity for countries to utilize and trade resources for stronger defense technologies and national security [34].

Ethics of space innovation

The Outer Space Treaty (OST), was established in 1967 as a foundational international agreement that governs space exploration, emphasizing peaceful uses and free access for all nations (5). Many people question the ethics of space innovation; for example, a smaller country with no space power may suffer the consequences of debris upon reentry from the spacecraft of a larger space-faring country. The AUKUS exemption should help bolster the same innovation that would get that spacecraft to launch in the first place, raising ethical concerns about who is involved; especially considering that the exemption is restricted to AUKUS partners as of now. Smaller countries with no current space technology may be left behind in a rapidly evolving regulatory landscape.

However, this ruling is in line with the OST; by instilling the ETL, the AUKUS alliance ensures the peaceful uses of outer space are maintained without the risk of dual-use technologies being exempt. Further, it helps ensure free access for all nations through the potential for expansion in Pillar 2. Nations like Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan—countries with close bilateral ties to the AUKUS partners—have sought to engage with the group. However, discussions so far have remained informal, with no official expansion of AUKUS membership [35]. With the new ruling, AUKUS now has the potential to move those conversations forward.

A large discussion around space ethics also revolves around whether the economic growth that a ruling like this would bring is universally desirable. While a variety of private space companies have established themselves in the last decade, some critics say that these companies focus mostly on profit and sustaining their business models with no real benefit to humanity. As such, there are ethical concerns that the ruling will inherently benefit an industry that only some countries are a part of in the first place and has been consistently criticized for environmental impact and high costs [36, 37].

A potential solution to the ethical problems raised is a legal framework that addresses sustainability concerns, but this will be complex considering the already intricate space regulatory regime. Regardless, when using the rule and updating it in the future, companies and governments alike could address these issues.

Takeaways

It is likely that these ethical concerns will need to be addressed in the future, but that is likely a few years away, as AUKUS rulings have yet to be finalized. In the meantime, by staying informed about current regulations and tracking ongoing updates, space companies can strengthen their partnerships with U.S. firms and support innovation through increased trade in specific technologies. Additionally, AUKUS may serve as a catalyst for further export reform in the future.

Conclusion

Even after the ITAR exemptions, will the U.K. and Australia be able to access the space capabilities they need from other partner markets? Regulatory exemptions have limitations and can only go so far. Effective implementation of the AUKUS security partnership requires that AUKUS partners apply threat response capabilities and timely intervention to mission areas of importance. This can be accomplished by applying a framework focused on AUKUS space-related technology acceleration via Pillar 2 “Advanced Capabilities.” It could be worth considering the threat-based incentive and how these advanced capabilities can mitigate AUKUS adversary threats, beyond the economic trade advantage of buying technologies via the AUKUS exemption.

Current and future space actors across public and private sectors who are involved in exports and imports of advanced technology can benefit from these rules. This article intends to raise awareness about the AUKUS ruling and its implications for the current space industry while also examining what it could mean for the future of the space industry.

Acknowledgments: The author would like to thank Lori Gordon for her contributions throughout the writing and editing process, as well as executive editor Audrey Bertin for her feedback throughout the process.

Citation

Mahajan, V. Strategic alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Shaping global security and accelerating space innovation. MIT Science Policy Review 6, 100-108 (2025). https://doi.org/10.38105/spr.al5ay69qu7.

Legislation Cited

References

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